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HOPE V. PELZER: INCREASING THE
ACCOUNTABILITY OF STATE ACTORS IN
PRISON SYSTEMS-A NECESSARY
ENTERPRISE IN GUARANTEEING THE
EIGHTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF PRISON
INMATES
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002)
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1996, Larry Hope, an Alabama prison inmate, was handcuffed to
the restraining bar known as a "hitching post" in Alabama's prison system.'
Not only was Hope left shirtless in the hot sun for seven hours, but guards
denied him water and toilet breaks for most of the day, ridiculing his
complaints of thirst.2 Hope suffered pain to his wrists and arms, muscle
aches, dehydration and sunburn.3 The Supreme Court in Hope v. Pelzer
held that: (1) Hope was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment; (2) officials can be on notice that their
conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances; and
(3) the Alabama prison guards in this case were not entitled to qualified
immunity because they had "fair notice" from: (a) binding Eleventh Circuit
precedent, (b) the Alabama Department of Corrections ("ADOC")
regulation on hitching posts, and (c) a Department of Justice ("DOJ") report
informing the ADOC that its particular use of the hitching post was
unconstitutional.4
This Note argues that Hope encourages judicial intervention through
its monitoring of state prison management, which may, in some cases, be
necessary to protect inmate rights. Part II will discuss prior Supreme Court
rulings regarding inmates' claims of Eighth Amendment violations in
relation to the Court's analysis of both the Eighth Amendment issues and
I Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 734 (2002).
2 Id. at 734-35.
3 Id. at 735 n.2.
4 Id. at 731-32.
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42 U.S.C. § 1983. Subpart A will focus on the Eighth Amendment and will
be split into two sections: the first will explain the evolution and application
of the deliberate indifference standard; and the second will explain the
evolution and application of the malice standard-a standard to detect an
actor's malicious intent to cause harm. Subpart B will briefly explain §
1983, which can be used either by plaintiffs to impose individual liability
on officers or by defendants to claim qualified immunity. Part III addresses
the factual and procedural history of Hope v. Pelzer and includes an
explanation of Austin v. Hopper5 which heavily influenced the Supreme
Court's decision. Part IV outlines the Majority and Dissenting opinions.
Part V argues that the Court's application of the deliberate indifference
standard narrowed the malice standard by more critically scrutinizing the
point at which an emergency situation ends and an inquiry into a lower
threshold of deliberate indifference begins. For example, by expanding the
sources of "fair notice" to include federal warnings to the prison
administration of unconstitutional punishments, Hope makes individual
officers accountable for constitutional violations. This section also explores
whether the Supreme Court intruded on the authority of the state's
executive and legislative purview.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution declares that "excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.",6  The Supreme Court has historically
defined cruel and unusual punishment in broad terms. In Trop v. Dulles,7
the Supreme Court first based its interpretation of cruel and unusual
punishment on the vague principle that the "basic concept underlying the
Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man." 8 Most notably,
however, the Court argued that its interpretation on the scope of the Eighth
Amendment would draw its meaning from the "evolving standards of
decency that marks the progress of a maturing society," a guideline that
continually resurfaced in Eighth Amendment cases, particularly when
addressing prison concerns. 9 Later, in Gregg v. Georgia,10 the Court built
5 15 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
6 U.S. CONST. amend. Vill.
356 U.S. 86 (1958).
8 Id. at 100.
Id. at 101.
0 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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on Trop's constitutional interpretation by defining cruel and unusual
punishment as any punishment "grossly disproportionate to the severity of
the crime," 1 any pain inflicted without penological justification, or as any
"unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain., 12
Over the last fifty years, several landmark cases have been brought by
prison inmates claiming Eighth Amendment violations by state prison
administrations or individual officers.' 3 Through these cases, the Supreme
Court not only refined its objective definition of "cruel and unusual
punishment," but also developed separate subjective standards for
determining Eighth Amendment violations. For example, when the Court
determined that the alleged mistreatment of the inmate or inmates occurred
because of prison conditions, the Court applied a "deliberate indifference"
standard.1 4 In contrast, when the Court dealt with incidents where pain was
inflicted on an inmate because of an alleged need to maintain prison order
or safety, or where excessive force was used, the Court applied a "malice"
standard.15 Meanwhile, various justices, including Justice Stevens, argued
that cruel and unusual punishment existed objectively regardless of the
actor's mental state.
1 6
1. Subjective Standards of Eighth Amendment Analysis
It is important to address the two subjective standards used by the
Supreme Court to analyze Eighth Amendment claims because they reflect
the justices' disparate views regarding judicial intervention in prison
systems. First, this sub-section will provide background on the Court's past
scrutiny of prison conditions, including its application of the deliberate
indifference standard. Second, it will explain the Court's use of the malice
standard to determine Eighth Amendment violations in emergency
situations where force may be required to maintain prison order and in other
situations where force has been used.
" Id. at 173.
12 id.
13 See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1
(1992); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986);
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86 (1958).
14 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297; Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
15 See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6; Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320.
16 See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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a. Eighth Amendment Application on Prison Conditions
Justice Marshall first spoke of the Court's institution of the "deliberate
indifference" standard in Estelle v. Gamble,17 where a plaintiff inmate
claimed prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to
provide him with adequate medical care.' 8 The Court held that deliberate
indifference by prison personnel to the serious medical needs of prisoners
was "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," and thus cruel and
unusual punishment, because it caused pain serving no penological
purpose. 19 Moreover, Justice Marshall stated that basic Eighth Amendment
principles established the government's duty to provide medical care to its
inmates, since inmates depended on the administration to preserve their
basic health.20  However, the Court emphasized that the mere denial of
adequate medical care without intent did not necessarily violate the Eighth
Amendment.2 ' In truth, this distinction may have been the Court's attempt
to exempt prison staff from accountability for poor inmate treatment in case
institutional failure was to blame. 2 Consequently, because the inmate
could not prove the doctor's intent to deny him care, the Estelle Court ruled
against the inmate's claim that the physician's failure to pursue all medical
avenues violated his constitutional rights.2 3
In his dissent, Justice Stevens criticized the Court's consideration of
the defendant's subjective motivations as a criterion for whether cruel and
unusual punishment was inflicted. 4 To Stevens, the violation was
objective. It existed in the character of the punishment, not the actor's
intent.2 5 At the same time, the state of prison conditions was universally
poor across the nation. 6 Thus, a purely objective standard may have
'7 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
8 d. at 101.
19 Id. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
20 Id. at 103.
21 Id. at 105.
22 Stevens noted in his dissent in Estelle that the substandard medical treatment of the
plaintiff inmate could have been due to an "overworked, undermanned medical staff in a
crowded prison" resulting in the "expedient course of routinely prescribing nothing more
than pain killers when a thorough diagnosis would [have] disclose[d] an obvious need for
remedial treatment." He also discussed studies of other state prisons, including those of
Texas, Pennsylvania and California, showing parallels between the negligent care given to
the Estelle plaintiff and to other prisoners of those states' systems who were subjected to
poor medical care from possible failures in institutional administration. id. at 110 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
23 Id. at 107.
24 Id. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
25 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
26 See Arthur B. Berger, Wilson v. Seiter: An Unsatisfying Attempt at Resolving the
[Vol. 93
HOPE v. PELZER
created too great an opportunity for inmates to find prison staff individually
accountable for conditions caused by institutional failures of the state.
Because the state legislature, not the judiciary, was traditionally seen as
responsible for prison management, Estelle's deliberate indifference
standard restrained the federal courts' capacity to intervene in state
administrative matters.
In 1981, Rhodes v. Chapman27 reaffirmed that the judiciary was not to
intervene in general matters of state prison management simply because the
court subjectively believed the prison conditions were unreasonable.28 The
Court had no need to address the appropriateness of a deliberate
indifference standard in Rhodes since it ruled that the conditions in
question, the "double-ceiling" of inmates, were objectively inoffensive to
Eighth Amendment principles .29 Rhodes held that as long as prison
conditions did not violate basic human needs, 30 such as essential food,
medical care or sanitation, they did not violate the Eighth Amendment.
3
'
Beyond these requirements, decisions by a prison administration regarding
its management of inmates were more "properly . . .weighed by the
legislature and prison administration rather than a court." 32 Justice Powell,
who delivered the majority opinion, emphasized that courts were ill-
equipped to handle the urgent problems of prison reform 33 and that they
should not assume that the legislative and executive branches were
"insensitive" to constitutional parameters.34 This statement drew heavy
criticism from Justice Marshall, who stated in the dissent, that such
"unfortunate dicta" could be interpreted by federal courts as a warning
against judicial intervention in state prison operations. 35  Moreover, he
complained that legislators and prison officials often disregarded Eighth
Imbroglio of Eighth Amendment Prisoners' Rights Standards, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 565, 578
("[B]y the mid-'60s and early '70s ... under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause[,]
... many prisoners found the conditions of their confinement, as well as their treatment by
prison officials, inhumane .... Over time ... necessity dictated that federal courts intervene
to correct the often brutish world in which prisoners were placed.").
27 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
28 Id. at 346-49.
29 Id. at 347.
30 In defining such needs, the Court referred to Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 684
(1978), which had ruled that inmates' treatment in punitive isolation cells within the
Arkansas prison system violated the Eighth Amendment due to the inmates' subjection to an
unfit diet, rampant prison violence and barbaric overcrowding. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
3' Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347-48.
32 Id. at 349.
33 Id. at 351 n. 16 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05).
34 Id. at 352.
35 Id. at 375 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Amendment principles, and thus federal intervention was necessary to
protect inmate rights.36 Similarly, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice
Stevens in a concurrence, highlighted that past judicial intervention was an
essential force in reforming inhumane prison conditions and encouraged
litigation against entire prison systems for constitutional violations.
37
However, the Rhodes majority opinion seemed to signal a precedent for
ensuring federalism when courts scrutinized state prison administration.
A decade after Rhodes, Justice Scalia wrote in the majority opinion for
Wilson v. Seiter38 that, despite an inmate's complaint of overcrowding,
inadequate heating and cooling, and unsanitary dining facilities and
restrooms, deliberate indifference would first have to be shown before
determining such conditions violated the Eighth Amendment, in light of a
lower court's ruling that such conditions had not deprived inmates of basic
human needs.39  In a concurring opinion, Justices White, Marshall,
Blackmun and Stevens attempted to reiterate that the objective severity of a
prison's conditions could alone determine whether the Eighth Amendment
was violated. 40 Their concern was that applying the deliberate indifference
test to prison conditions would insulate officials and state administrations
from constitutional challenge as long as they exhibited concern about the
inhumane conditions in the prisons they managed.
Justice Souter again used the deliberate indifference standard in
Farmer v. Brennan.42 He stated that prison officials could have violated the
Eighth Amendment if their refusal to segregate a transsexual inmate from
the general prison population signaled a conscious disregard of a substantial
risk of harm to the inmate-it was possible a fact-finder could conclude that
an official had knowledge of a substantial risk by circumstantial evidence
that the risk was obvious.43  Although Justices Blackmun and Stevens
agreed with the majority ruling in their concurrence, they again criticized
the use of a subjective standard for determining cruel and unusual
punishment reasoning that an objective standard would have increased
accountability for prison officials. 44 In many cases, including Farmer, the
justices' differences regarding the deliberate indifference standard-a
36 Id. at 376 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
37 Id. at 354, 359 (Brennan, J., concurring).
38 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
39 Id. at 304-06.
" Id. at 309 (White, J., concurring).
41 Id. at 311 (White, J., concurring).
42 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
43 Id. at 827.
44 Id. at 854-57 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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subjective standard-reflected their differences on judicial intervention in
state prison management.
b. Eighth Amendment Application on Emergency Situations and the Use of
Excessive Force
The malice standard, a higher threshold than "deliberate indifference,"
has been applied to cases where the plaintiff inmate claimed an Eighth
Amendment violation under circumstances of excessive force or of an
emergency situation requiring force. The Court first implemented this
standard in Whitley v. Albers, where an inmate claimed he was subjected
to cruel and unusual punishment when he was shot in the leg by a guard
during an attempt to control a prison riot.46 Whitley held that an infliction
of pain resulting from a prison security measure would violate the Eighth
Amendment only if done maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of
causing harm.4 7 Therefore, the guard did not violate the Eighth Amendment
because he did not act "maliciously," but made a reasonably necessary
decision in context. 48 The Court explained that in the face of a threat to
prison order, unlike the context of general prison conditions, officials must
consciously and quickly weigh the harm of one or more individuals against
their competing duty of maintaining safety for the staff and other inmates.49
Thus, because the deliberate indifference standard could not account for the
complexity of an official's competing obligations nor the exigency under
which she had to act in an emergency situation, the malice standard more
ably determined whether or not any pain inflicted was excessive. 50 Justices
Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens dissented arguing that the use of
force by the guard was not necessary to prevent imminent danger.51
Moreover, they reasoned that a prison disturbance should not necessarily
trigger the use of the subjective malice standard.52 First, there may have
been no real danger threatening the officer that justified inflicting pain, and
second, the issue of whether a significant risk existed for the officer was a
question for a jury. 53
" 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
46 Id. at 316-17.
41 Id. at 320-21.
48 Id. at 313.
41 Id. at 320.
'o Id. at 320-21.
51 Id. at 331 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
52 Id. at 329 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
53 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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In Hudson v. McMillian,54 the Court extended the malice standard to
determine whether any use of force by prison officials was excessive. In
Hudson, when guards handcuffed and physically beat an inmate absent a
prison riot, the Court held that their acts violated the Eighth Amendment
because they were done maliciously to cause harm.56 Therefore, the malice
standard was to be applied to "lesser disruption[s]" as well as to prison
riots, as occurred in Whitley.57 Any use of force compelled the question of
whether such action was necessary to maintain prison order or restore
discipline.58 In contrast, the lesser "deliberate indifference" standard would
potentially conflict with the prison administration's policies-policies that,
in the administration's judgment, preserved internal security and should be
granted deference by the courts.59 Justice Stevens again argued in
concurrence that a subjective standard of malice was misplaced. 60 He stated
that Eighth Amendment violations should objectively turn on whether there
was any unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.6'
In sum, the Justices were continually divided on the appropriateness of
subjective tests in Eighth Amendment analyses. This division reflected the
broader disagreement within the Court on the extent to which prison
administrations should be held accountable for inmate treatment and on
whether to increase judicial intervention in state prison management.
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983: CIVIL ACTION FOR DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS
Occasionally, when inmates claim that prison guards subjected them to
cruel and unusual punishment that violated the Eighth Amendment, they
also state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") to
impose individual liability on the actor.62 Section 1983 instructs the
following:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
" 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
15 Id. at 6-7.
56 Id. at 4-10.
" Id. at 6-7.
58 Id.
59 Id. (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1986)).
60 Id. at 12-13 (Stevens, J., concurring).
61 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
62 See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312




in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be 8 ranted unless a declaratory
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. DISTRICT COURT DECISION
In 1996, Plaintiff Larry Hope, a prison inmate at Alabama's Limestone
Correction Facility ("LCF"), sued eight officers in the District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama for violating his Eighth Amendment rights on
two separate occasions.64 He stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to find
the guards individually liable.65  Hope also alleged a Fourteenth
Amendment due process violation which the court dismissed because there
was no evidence of service of process or a signature on the complaint.
66
Thus, the heart of the case turned on Hope's Eighth Amendment claim that
the guards subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment on the two
following occasions: first, on May 11, 1995, when defendant Officer Gene
McClaran handcuffed him to a restraining bar and second, on June 7, 1995,
when several defendant officers used excessive force on him and placed
him on the restraining bar a second time.67
Hope claimed that on May 11, he and another inmate had a verbal
fight while out on the chain gang.68 While McClaran alleged that Hope
raised a tool towards the other inmate,69 Hope asserted that McClaran
misinterpreted this exchange as an attempt to assault the inmate. y
However, both agreed that as a result, McClaran removed Hope and the
other inmate from the work squad and transported them back to the prison,
where they were then cuffed to the "hitching post," or restraining bar, for
being "disruptive" to the work squad.7' Hope alleged that because he was
only slightly taller than the bar itself, his arms were raised high, which
caused great pain to his wrists and discomfort to his arms from poor
63 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
64 Hope v. Pelzer, 240 F.3d 975, 977 (1 1th Cir. 2001).
65 Joint Appendix at 14, Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (No. 01-309).
66 Hope, 240 F.3d at 977 n.3.
67 id.
68 Joint Appendix at 9, Hope (No. 01-309).
69 Id. at 16.




circulation." He was on the bar for two hours, during which time he was
offered bathroom and water breaks at fifteen-minute intervals as were
required by the Alabama Department of Corrections' ("ADOC") regulation
regarding use of the hitching post.
7 3
Hope alleged another violation stemming from an incident on June 7,
the primary focus of his suit, and described the following facts: 74 he had
angered one of the officers because he was napping on the bus when it
arrived at the inmate work site.75 As a result, the guard began choking
him. 76 In retaliation, he grabbed the officer's neck.77 At that point, the
other defendant officers attempted to subdue Hope, which led to another
fight. 78 Ultimately, the officers subdued and handcuffed Hope. 79 Although
at no time did he refuse to work, he was still placed in leg irons and
transported back to the prison for his "disruptive" behavior on the work
squad.80 The medical staff examined him and noticed a few bruises. 8'
Later, he was handcuffed to the hitching post by one of the defendant
officers.82 Hope then remained on the restraining bar for seven hours in the
hot sun, during which time officers at the post made him remove his shirt so
that one of them could clean the officer's van with it.83 This additional
exposure led him to suffer more intensely from sunburn. 84 He received
water only once or twice while on the bar and at one point was not offered
water for at least three hours during the hottest part of the day. 85  In
addition, two guards taunted him when he requested water and brought
prison dogs before him to drink from a cooler they later kicked over at his
feet.86 Throughout this entire episode, the handcuffs hurt his wrists and
72 Brief for Petitioner at 4, Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (No. 01-309).
73 Brief for Respondents at 4-5, Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (No. 01-309).




78 Id. at 49-50.
79 Id. at 16-17.
'o Id. at 17.
"' Brief for Respondents at 6-7, Hope (No. 0 1-309).
82 Brief for Petitioner at 4, Hope (No. 0 1-309).
83 Id.
84 id.
85 Joint Appendix at 47-48, Hope (No. 01-309). The activity log, which was required by
the ADOC to track the inmate's necessary fifteen-minute interval bathroom and water
breaks, was also never filled in. Id.
86 Brief for Petitioner at 4-5, Hope (No. 0 1-309).
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impaired the circulation in his arms, and his wrists were swollen and
bruised after he was released.
87
Defendants argued that Hope stated no cause of action under the
Eighth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.88 In answer to Hope's
first claim of excessive force when he was subdued by officers on June 7,
the defendants referred to Whitley's malice standard as it was applied in
Hudson, where the question was whether force was applied in a good-faith
effort to restore order or used maliciously and sadistically to cause harm,
thus classifying it as excessive.89 The officers argued that their actions were
necessary to subdue Hope to maintain internal security and prison order. 90
The defendants also claimed qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 9'
Citing the Supreme Court's ruling in Wilson, the defendants argued that in
order for a plaintiff to win an Eighth Amendment claim pursuant to § 1983,
deliberate indifference must be shown before the plaintiff can find the actor
individually liable.92 However, Hope had not pled that any subjective intent
existed.
93
In answer to Hope's second claim that the officers' use of the
"hitching post" was a violation of the Eighth Amendment, the defendants
countered that such action was necessary to prevent any further disruptions
to the work squad and to discourage other inmates from similar conduct. 94
They argued that because the placement of Hope on the post was necessary
to maintain prison order, it was not an Eighth Amendment violation
according to Whitley.95 The District Court granted summary judgment for
the defendant prison guards on grounds of qualified immunity under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, but did not rule on whether cuffing Hope to the hitching
post violated the Eighth Amendment.
96
Between the time Hope filed his suit in 1996 and the District Court's
ruling in 2000, another district court in Alabama issued its 1998 ruling in
Austin v. Hopper,97 a separate class action case where Hope was a
member.
98
87 Joint Appendix at 50, Hope (No. 01-309).
88 Id. at 15.
89 Id. at 18-19 (citing Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992)).
90 Id. at 18.
91 Id. at 15.
92 Id. at 19.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 21.
95 Id.
96 Hope v. Pelzer, 240 F.3d 975, 977 (1 1th Cir. 2001).
97 15 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
98 Id. at 1247-48.
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1. Austin v. Hopper Decision
Austin held that the Alabama prison system's use of the hitching post
as punishment was unconstitutional.99 The court determined this under both
subjective standards of Eighth Amendment analysis: deliberate indifference
and malice. 00 It also ruled that the punishment was objectively cruel and
unusual. 10
First, there was evidence that inmates' hands were often cuffed at or
above head level causing arm and wrist pain, that their awkward position at
the bar caused severe discomfort, and that standing in the sun unprotected
for extended periods burned their skin and dehydrated them. 10 2 Thus, there
was the objective element of an infliction of pain. Second, according to
ADOC regulation which governed the use of the hitching post, the purpose
of the restraining bar was to discipline inmates for being disruptive to the
work squad.10 3  The regulation itemized actions that would trigger
placement on the post: (1) refusal to work; (2) disruptive to work squad; (3)
refusal to walk in a prescribed manner; or (4) refusal to carry a tool to job
site and "other" unspecified reasons. 0 4 The Commissioner of the ADOC
conceded in testimony that some of these reasons were not appropriate to
trigger placement on the hitching post because they were not "emergency"
situations where prison safety or order was threatened by the inmate's
actions such as walking or carrying a tool improperly.'0 5 Additionally, if
one refused to work while still at the prison instead of refusing while at
work with other inmates, that was also not an emergency situation and did
not justify placement on the bar. 10 6 Therefore, not only were some of the
state sanctioned reasons potentially improper triggers for hitching post
punishment, but an investigation by the DOJ showed many facilities
misused the hitching post for unauthorized and trivial non-emergency
offenses. 10 7 The Austin court noted that the non-binding standards of the
American Correctional Association and the American Bar Association
found that the use of restraints, such as hitching posts, in non-emergency
situations caused harm to inmates. 108 Because such punishment served no
I d. at 1215.
o Id. at 1254-55.
I d. at 1260.
02 Id. at 1256-57.




1o7 Id. at 1249-50.
108 Id. at 1259-60.
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penological purpose, it met the Supreme Court's definition of cruel and
unusual punishment as defined in Gregg.10 9 There was also evidence that in
some cases inmates were denied the required water breaks and bathroom
breaks to the point where they defecated on themselves." 0 In sum, the
District Court ruled that the routine use of hitching posts in non-emergency
situations, which consistently subjected inmates to pain and where they
were often denied basic human needs during their time on the post,
illustrated that the practice of disciplining an inmate on the hitching post
was an objective violation of the Eighth Amendment."'
The court in Austin argued that both subjective standards of deliberate
indifference and malice should be used in determining whether the hitching
post punishment violated Eighth Amendment principles.' 12 In instances
when the hitching post was used in non-emergency situations, the court
decided to apply the deliberate indifference standard because these
incidents were effectively part of prison conditions. 13 Additionally, an
official could be liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane
conditions only if he or she knew the inmate faced a "substantial risk of
serious harm" and "disregarded the risk by failing to take reasonable
measures to abate it." 114 Under this analysis, the court argued that because
the risks of physical harm attached to the use of the hitching post were very
obvious, officials must have known the risks and simply failed to
reasonably abate them. 15 Thus, deliberate indifference was shown proving
an Eighth Amendment violation."16 Alternatively, in instances when the
hitching post was used in emergency situations, the court decided to apply
the malice standard per the Supreme Court's rulings in Whitley and Hudson.
For example, the court interpreted Hope's incident of being handcuffed to
the hitching post on June 7 as a situation where an inmate's behavior
created an emergency situation that justified the use of force." 7 Even under
this analysis, the court found that the officers who cuffed Hope to and
mistreated him on the bar acted maliciously and sadistically to cause him
harm.' 18 The guards' denial of Hope's required bathroom and water breaks,
their cruel taunting of him for his thirst, and the lack of evidence that it was
109 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
110 Austin, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 1245-46.
"' Id. at 1260.
112 Id. at 1261-65.
13 Id. at 1261.
114 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994).
115 Austin, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 1261.
116 Id. at 1262.
117 Id. at 1264.
'8 Id. at 1264-65.
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necessary to keep Hope in restraints to maintain prison order or security
satisfied Whitley's subjective standard of malice, deeming the use of the
hitching post unconstitutional." 9  The court conceded that using the
hitching post for the purpose of quelling an emergency threat may be
appropriate, but that the post's capacity as a means of discipline was
unconstitutional. 
20
B. ELEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISION
By the time Hope appealed his individual suit to the Eleventh Circuit
in 2000, he had dropped his excessive force claim and his suit against five
of the eight officers, leaving Mark Pelzer, Gene McClaran and Jim Gates as
the remaining defendants.' 2' The Court of Appeals held that Hope's
constitutional rights were violated after considering both the objective and
subjective requirements of the Eighth Amendment analysis, but that the
guards were entitled to qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because
they did not have fair notice that they were violating constitutional rights.
1 22
At the same time, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the District Court's
holding in Austin, which ruled the policy and practice of using a hitching
post as a form of punishment unconstitutional. 
23
Under the objective test, an infliction of pain that offends the evolving
standards of decency, is grossly disproportionate to the offense, or serves no
penological purpose, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. 24  The
Eleventh Circuit ruled that the placement and treatment of Hope on the
restraining bar satisfied all these definitions. 25 It cited Gates v. Collier,126 a
case where officers routinely cuffed inmates to stationary objects as
punishment. 27 Gates held that handcuffing inmates to the fence or cells for
long periods of time ran afoul of the Eighth Amendment because such
conditions of confinement violated evolving concepts of decency. 28 Thus,
handcuffing an inmate to a hitching post was found similarly offensive by
the Court of Appeals.1 29 Furthermore, because Hope was denied the basic
119 Id. at 1265.
120 id.
121 Hope v. Pelzer, 240 F.3d 975, 977 (11 th Cir. 2001).
122 Id. at 975-81.
23 Id. at 980.
124 See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981); Gregg v. Georgia 428 U.S.
153, 173 (1976); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
125 Hope, 240 F.3d at 979.
126 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974).
127 Hope, 240 F.3d at 979.




human needs of water, shelter from the heat and sun, and bathroom breaks
while he was fastened to the bar on June 7, his treatment offended the
civilized standards of humanity and decency and was thus a violation of the
Eighth Amendment. 1
30
Under the subjective test, the Circuit court applied the deliberate
indifference standard.1 3' It characterized Hope's punishment on the post as
a condition of confinement and not as a punishment triggered by an
emergency situation. 32 The court followed the same classification used in
Farmer where the failure to protect a transsexual inmate from predictable
abusive treatment by his peers was assessed as a condition of confinement
requiring the deliberate indifference standard. 133  The Eleventh Circuit
found that, in line with Farmer's definition of deliberate indifference, Hope
proved that the guards were more than simply negligent; the guards
disregarded a "substantial risk of serious harm" of Hope's dehydration,
sunburn, and pain, by failing to take reasonable measures to abate that
risk. 134 Farmer emphasized that officials only needed to be aware of the
risk of harm, not believe that actual harm would occur.'35 Therefore, the
court inferred that the guards were aware of the risks of harm to Hope since
the risks were obvious. 136 Furthermore, the court cited the DOJ's warning
to the ADOC of the unconstitutional nature of the hitching post as a
punishment and also its discovery that guards frequently used the rail for
improper punitive purposes. 137  Thus, it ruled that since the ADOC was
aware of the substantial risk of harm created by use of the hitching post for
prolonged periods of time, the act against Hope was committed with
deliberate indifference.'
38
Meanwhile, the Eleventh Circuit pointedly noted that it declined to
follow the district court's use of the malice standard in Austin as it applied
to Hope. 39 The court in Austin applied Whitley's malice standard when
evaluating Hope's claim because, the court reasoned, he initially threatened
prison security and triggered an emergency situation, which led to his
placement on the post. 40  In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit stated that
130 Id. (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)).
131 Id. at 978.
132 Id.
133 id.
134 Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994)).
135 Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).
136 id.
"' Id. at 979.
139 id.
139 Id. at 978.
140 Id. at 979 (citing Austin v. Hopper, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1255 (M.D. Ala. 1998)).
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because Hope was already subdued in leg irons and driven back to the
prison after his altercation created a threat to safety, the status of
"emergency" was over by the time he was placed on the hitching post. 14 1
Even though the ADOC claimed that Hope would have been released if he
had agreed to return to work, the court noted that Hope never refused to
work and that, because the officers transferred him back to the distant
facility, it was unlikely he could have returned to the squad had he voiced
an interest to return. 42 Therefore, it was unlikely that he was placed or
remained on the bar because he continued to threaten prison order.
43
Instead, his placement on the bar represented a condition of confinement.1
44
Finally, the court established a "bright-line" rule for future cases
involving prison authorities' use of the hitching post.1 45 Because restraining
an inmate beyond the need to maintain security was cruel and unusual
punishment, the Eleventh Circuit supported Austin's ruling in that the
policy and practice of using the hitching post as a means of discipline was
unconstitutional.146 The only permissible reason for hitching an inmate to a
post would be for non-punitive, emergency situations. 147 The court granted
the guards qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that
defendant officials had no fair notice that their actions were unconstitutional
prior to the Circuit's creation of this bright-line rule. 148 It posited that other
cases did not serve as fair notice because the cases did not have facts that
were "materially similar" to Hope's case. 149 The court also stated that no
cases had clearly indicated to a reasonable official that use of the hitching
post was unconstitutional.150 Thus, it affirmed the district court's judgment
that the guards were not individually liable or financially responsible for
their constitutional violations. 151
141 Id. at 978 (citing Austin, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 1265).
142 Id. at 980.
143 id.
144 Id. at 978.
145 Id. at 981.
146 Id. at 980-81.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 981.
149 id.
50 Id. at 981-82 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
151 Id. at 982.
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C. PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
In 2000, Hope filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court, which was granted. 52 In 2002, the Court agreed to consider three
issues: (1) whether an inmate was subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment when prison guards handcuffed him to a hitching post for
disruptive behavior after the inmate was already subdued; (2) whether
officials had fair notice that their conduct was unconstitutional even in
novel factual circumstances; and (3) whether Alabama prison guards were
entitled to qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 5 The Court
granted certiorari in order to determine whether the Court of Appeals'
qualified immunity requirement on "materially similar" facts comported
with the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Lanier154 that prior
decisions may give reasonable warning despite notable factual
differences.' 55
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
The majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens, held that: (1) Hope
was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment when prison guards cuffed him to a hitching post for disruptive
behavior after he had already been subdued; (2) officials can be on notice
that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual
circumstances; and (3) Alabama prison guards were not entitled to qualified
immunity from inmate's claim in light of: (a) binding Eleventh Circuit
precedent, (b) ADOC regulation, and (c) DOJ report informing ADOC of
the regulation's constitutional infirmity in its use of the hitching post.
56
1. Attaching Hope to the Hitching Post Under his Alleged Circumstances
Violated the Eighth Amendment
The Court first established that when pain was inflicted "totally
without penological justification," it was "unnecessary and wanton,"'157 and
152 Joint Appendix at 4, Hope (No. 01-309).
153 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 730-31 (2002).
114 520 U.S. 259 (1997).
Hope, 536 U.S. at 736. (citing Lanier, 520 U.S. at 269).
156 Id. at 730-31. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsberg and Breyer. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting
opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia.
157 Id. at 737 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981)).
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an "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" that constituted cruel and
unusual punishment-an objective violation of the Eighth Amendment. 58
In particular, if pain was inflicted as a condition of confinement, then the
Court would additionally determine whether the action was done with
"deliberate indifference" to the inmate's health or safety. 159 In such a case,
if there was both an objective violation and the requisite state of mind, the
Court would find a constitutional violation.' 60 When the risk of harm to the
inmate was obvious, a fact finder could infer that the requisite state of mind
existed, and conclude that the actor manifested deliberate indifference. '
6
'
The Court held the guards violated the Eighth Amendment under both
objective and subjective standards. 62 Borrowing heavily from the Alabama
district court's findings in Austin, the Court stated that the guards' violation
of the Eighth Amendment was "obvious."' ' 63 Because there was a clear lack
of an emergency situation where prison security was threatened, no reason
could have justified inflicting pain on Hope by his placement on the bar. 64
First, Hope was already subdued in leg irons and handcuffs after the
altercation with the guards and before he was taken back to prison to be
shackled to the post. 165 Furthermore, it was unlikely that Hope was
transported away from the work squad to prevent further disruptive
behavior or to coerce him to work in order to maintain prison security
measures. 66 He never actually refused to work and was not likely given the
chance to retum to the squad considering the great distance he was from the
work site. 67 Hope's placement on the post was clearly a "punitive" and
"gratuitous" infliction of pain which had no penological purpose and was
thus an objective violation of the Eighth Amendment. 68
Second, his denial of water and bathroom breaks for a seven hour
period and his unnecessary exposure to the sun proved that the guards
"knowingly subjected him to a substantial risk of harm" and were aware of
that harm, which proved deliberate indifference. 169 Relying again on the
findings in Austin, Justice Stevens noted that an awareness of harmful risk
158 1d. (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)).
159 Id. at 738 (quoting Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1,8 (1992)).
160 id.








169 Id. at 737.
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could also be determined by the pattern of treatment inmates generally
receive when attached to a hitching post, which Austin proved was
commonly inhumane. 70 Thus, deliberate indifference in this instance was
deducible.1
71
2. Despite its Consistency With Eleventh Circuit Rulings, the Court of
Appeals'Requirement that Prior Cases' Facts be "Materially Similar" to
Hope's Situation in Order to Give the Defendant Officers Fair Notice of the
Law is Inconsistent with Supreme Court Precedent
By deigning it a "rigid gloss" on the qualified immunity standard, the
Court criticized the Court of Appeals' requirement that only "materially
similar" case facts could provide officers fair notice of unconstitutional
behavior.172 The Court disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit's finding that
because Hope's facts were not "materially similar" to other Circuit
precedent which held analogous facts unconstitutional, it meant that the
officers in Hope's case had no fair notice that their actions violated the
Eighth Amendment. 7 3  In fact, the Eleventh Circuit's requirement
contradicted the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Lanier.'
74
First, as it was stated in Saucier v. Katz, 175 the purpose of § 1983's
qualified immunity protection was to ensure that officers were on notice
that their conduct was unlawful before they were subject to suit. 176 Under §
1983, officers may be shielded from liability for civil damages if their
actions did not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable
officer would have known.' 77 "Clearly established" rights meant the law
was sufficiently clear for a reasonable official to understand that he was
violating it.' 78 At the same time, it was not necessary for the exact action of
the official to have been previously held unlawful in order to provide him
fair notice that his act would be considered such. 179 For example, if pre-
existing law proved the unlawfulness was apparent, that would be sufficient
notice. 80





175 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001).
176 Hope, 536 U.S. at 739.
177 Id. (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
178 Id. (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
179 Id. (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 535 (1985)).
180 Id. (citing Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640).
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Second, under United States v. Lanier, officers have the same right to
"fair notice" in § 1983 claims as they do in 18 U.S.C. § 242 claims.' 8 '
Lanier established that fair notice existed as long as precedent cases gave
reasonable warning that the conduct violated constitutional rights. 8 2 It did
not matter whether there were notable factual distinctions between
precedent cases and the case at issue. 183 In that case, the Supreme Court
explained that clear notice did not require cases to be "fundamentally
similar" in factual character. 184 Therefore, officials can still be on notice if
their situation presents "novel factual circumstances."',
85
3. Guards Were Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity Because They Had Fair
Notice that Their Use of the Hitching Post Clearly Violated the Eighth
Amendment
The Court held that the guards had fair notice that their use of the
hitching post in Hope's case violated the Eighth Amendment in three ways:
(a) binding Eleventh Circuit precedent that indicated handcuffing an inmate
to a post was unconstitutional, (b) the ADOC regulation establishing the
circumstances for the post's use, and (c) the DOJ report informing the
ADOC of the unconstitutionality of its hitching post practices.
The Court noted that Supreme Court precedent on Eighth Amendment
claims already established fair notice to the defendant officers that their
conduct was unconstitutional. 186 At the same time, it emphasized that the
Eleventh Circuit precedent also provided clear warning-first in Gates and
then in Ort.187 In Gates, the court held that handcuffing inmates to the
fence and to cells for long periods of time or forcing them to stand in
awkward positions for long periods violated the Eighth Amendment.
188
Even the government's amicus curiae brief stated no reasonable officer
could have thought cuffing an inmate to a post was constitutional when
cuffing one to a cell or fence was found unconstitutional in Gates.' 89 In
Ort, the court found that a denial of a basic human need, such as drinking
water, was constitutional if it was necessary to maintain prison security due
to an emergency situation, including the security threat of an inmate
.8. Id. at 739-40 (citing United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 270-71 (1997)).
182 Id. (citing Lanier, 520 U.S. at 269).
183 id.
184 id.
185 Id. at 739-40.
186 Id. at 740.
187 Id.
188 Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1306 (5th Cir. 1974).
189 Hope, 536 U.S. at 742-43.
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refusing to work on-site. 90 However, once the coercive measure extended
beyond the need to ensure order and safety, it was unconstitutional.' 9 It
was merely "punishment" without penological justification. 192
The guards had also operated beyond the framework of the ADOC
rules concerning the proper use of the hitching post in two ways. 193 The
defendant officers disregarded the ADOC rule of fifteen-minute log-in
entries for water and toilet breaks. 194  Moreover, the restraining bar's
official function was to coerce inmates to return to work after they were
found disruptive to the squad, which could threaten security. 95  The
regulation instructed guards to release and allow inmates to join the work
squad as soon as they vocalized their willingness to return to work.
196
Because it appeared likely that the guards did not intend to offer Hope an
option of conditional release, and that it was common practice to deny it,
they seemed aware of their wrongful conduct.'
197
Finally, the DOJ study in 1994 proved that guards in Alabama prisons
consistently disregarded the regulations and that the hitching post was used
as a punishment for trivial offenses as opposed to a means of restoring order
and security as defended by the ADOC.' 98 In fact, the DOJ had already
notified the ADOC that its regulation was unconstitutional in 1994.'99
Therefore, the Court found that the officers had fair notice.
200
B. DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Thomas delivered the dissenting opinion and was joined by
Justice Scalia.2°' In summary, he criticized the majority ruling on its
qualified immunity jurisprudence and its views on the appropriate methods
of prison discipline. He also noted that Hope's pleadings were unclear as to
which acts the named defendants had actually committed. It was not clear,
for example which defendant guard actually handcuffed him to the post.
20 2
190 Id. at 743 (citing Ort v. White, 813 F.2d 318, 325 (1 1th Cir. 1987)).
191 Id.




96 Id at 744.
197 id.
198 Id.
'9' Id. at 745.
200 Id. at 745-46.
201 Id. at 748 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
202 Id. at 748-49 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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The dissenting Justices could not reconcile how Hope sued three
prison guards for violating his rights while his exact allegations against
each guard were vague, especially against McClaran and Pelzer.20 3 They
argued that Hope never alleged that McClaran and Pelzer participated in the
June 7 incident-the primary event effecting the constitutional violation-
and thus, it was not clear how the Court determined that these two
defendants violated the Eighth Amendment.2 °4
The dissent had another major concern. Justice Thomas argued that
the unconstitutionality of cuffing an inmate to a restraining bar was not
"clearly established., 20 5 He stated that the Eleventh Circuit requirement
that a plaintiffs circumstances and prior cases must share "materially
similar" facts in order to warrant officers' fair notice was appropriate.20 6 He
cited to an unreported case from an Alabama district court that had rejected
an inmate's Eighth Amendment claim that his placement on the restraining
bar had no penological justification.2 7 It was not obvious that guards acted
with "deliberate indifference" because the violation was not "obvious,"
especially in light of how the district court ruling proved the opposite.20
8
Lastly, Justice Thomas argued that: (a) the DOJ notice to the ADOC
was not fair notice if the guards did not know about it, (b) the guards were
obeying the ADOC regulations, and (c) Gates-a Fifth Circuit case, and
hence Eleventh Circuit precedent, that held cuffing inmates to cells and
fences unconstitutional-did not establish a "bright-line" rule because it
was not clear how long the inmates were cuffed in that case nor did it
indicate whether water and toilet breaks were offered in that situation.20 9
C. MAJORITY OPINION'S REBUTTAL TO JUSTICE THOMAS' DISSENT
The majority made three points in response to Justice Thomas'
dissent.210  First, it argued that nothing in the decision foreclosed the
officers from using other defenses.2 ' In granting certiorari, the Court did
not take the question about the sufficiency of pleadings, which stated the
three named officers who were responsible for the punitive act of shackling
203 Id. at 749 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
204 Id. at 751 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
205 Id. at 752 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
206 Id. at 754 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
207 Id. at 756 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
208 Id. at 751 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
209 Id. at 758-64 (Thomas, J., dissenting).





alleged by Hope. Second, the Court decided that Hope's punishment was
unconstitutional because there was an infliction of pain absent a threat of
disorder or a refusal to work, and therefore the infliction had no penological
justification.1 3  The denial of water and bathroom breaks was an
exacerbating factor.214 Third, the unreported district court opinions cited by
the officers do not outweigh the Eleventh Circuit precedent of Ort and
Gates, which are consistent with the Supreme Court cases on Eighth
Amendment violations.21 5  The Supreme Court applied an objective
immunity standard of what a reasonable officer would understand in light of
federal judicial precedent.1 6
V. ANALYSIS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
1. Why the Court's Use of the Deliberate Indifference Standard in the
Eighth Amendment Analysis Represents an Expansion of Prisoners' Rights
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens first held that the placement
and treatment of Hope on the hitching post violated the Eighth Amendment
mainly because Hope had already been subdued.217 Because the majority
believed that any emergency need to restrain him ended prior to his
attachment to the bar, it ruled that any further inflictions of pain had no
penological purpose. Such conduct constituted cruel and unusual
punishment under the objective test.218
When it came to analyzing the subjective component of Hope's claim,
the Court's choice to apply the deliberate indifference standard instead of
the malice standard signaled a conscious move by the Court to lower the
subjective threshold in finding constitutional violations. Moreover, the
decision was delivered by Justice Stevens, a critic of subjective standards in
Eighth Amendment cases. In the past, Justice Stevens not only disagreed
with Estelle and Wilson's implementation of the deliberate indifference
standard as it applied to conditions of confinement, but adamantly opposed






217 Id. at 736-38.
218 id.
219 Stevens, in a concurring opinion in Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1992),
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component of cruel and unusual punishment was enough to signal a
constitutional violation.2 °
Again, historically, when the Court determined an objective violation
of the Eighth Amendment existed in a case involving a prison inmate, it
would then determine whether the cruel and unusual punishment was
simply a condition of his confinement or occurred in response to an
emergency situation, so that it could know whether to apply the deliberate
indifference or the malice standard. The malice standard was clearly a
higher threshold than deliberate indifference. 22' The former asked whether
the defendant had used force in good faith to maintain order or maliciously
and sadistically to cause harm.222 In Whitley, for example, the defendant
officer's shooting of an inmate during a prison riot was held not to violate
any constitutional right; the officer was responding to an emergency
situation where his obligation to maintain prison safety competed against
his duty to prevent harm to an individual.223 When there was a threat to
security, Whitley argued that not only should prison administrators and their
practices be granted greater deference by the courts, but that the deliberate
indifference standard would thwart this capacity. 224 The malice standard
would instead address the complexity of emergencies. 225 Justice Stevens
joined in the criticism of Whitley's heightened threshold and argued that
'emergency" situations did not always infer the defendant was in danger or
stated that the Court's application of the malice standard to determine whether excessive
force was used against an inmate was incorrect. He also joined in Justice Marshall's dissent
in Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 328 (1985), which argued that the majority had erred in
its "especially onerous standard," referring to the use of the malice standard in "emergency"
situations where prison order or safety was threatened. Marshall explained that the standard
was "particularly inappropriate because courts deciding whether to apply it must resolve a
preliminary issue of fact that will often be disputed and properly left to the jury."
220 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 12 (Stevens, J., concurring); Whitley, 475 U.S. at 328-29
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
22 1 The malice standard required the Court to determine whether evidence showed more
than a mere dispute over the reasonableness of an actor's use of force. Whitley, 475 U.S. at
322.
222 Id. at 320-21.
223 Id. (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)) ("[P]rison administrators
are charged with the responsibility of ensuring the safety of the prison staff, administrative
personnel, and visitors, as well as the 'obligation to take reasonable measures to guarantee
the safety of the inmates themselves."').
224 Id. ("In this setting, a deliberate indifference standard does not adequately capture the
importance of such competing obligations, or convey the appropriate hesitancy to critique in
hindsight decisions necessarily made in haste, under pressure, and frequently without the




needed to inflict harm on an inmate.226 In fact, in the Whitley case, there
was great dispute as to whether emergency status still existed by the time
the guard shot the inmate without warning.227 Other evidence existed that
the guard was not in danger.225 Thus, the Whitley dissent found the
application of a heightened standard that was merely triggered by a prison
disruption to be over-inclusive of situations where no force or harm was
necessary.
229
In assessing Hope's facts, like Whitley, it is unclear when the
emergency terminated because it is unclear how long Hope resisted
authority. Hope claims he did not refuse to work before being placed on the
bar, but there is also no evidence as to whether guards asked if he was
willing to return to the work squad while on the post.230 The Court infers
that this was not an option since Hope was transported a great distance from
the work site. 23  Moreover, evidence showed that the hitching post was
informally used by guards for disciplinary action, not as a means to contain
emergency situations.232 Therefore, the exact point at which Hope would
no longer have been perceived as resistant or disruptive seems open to
interpretation.
Depending on how it characterized the state of emergency faced by the
guards, the Court could have applied either the deliberate indifference
standard or the malice standard.233 For example, the Court determined that
226 Id. at 329-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The full circumstances of the plaintiffs injury, including whether it was inflicted during an
attempt to quell a riot and whether there was a reasonable apprehension of danger, should be
considered by the factfinder in determining whether that standard is satisfied in a particular case.
There is simply no justification for creating a distinct and more onerous burden for the plaintiff
... merely because the judge believes.., the injury at issue was caused during a disturbance that
'pose[d] significant risks to the safety of inmates."'
Id.
227 Id. at 330-31 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
228 Id. at 330 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
229 Id. at 329 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
230 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 n.5 (2002) (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 240 F.3d 975,
980 (1 1th Cir. 2001) ("There is nothing in the record.., claiming that he refused to work...
therefore, it is not clear that the solution to his hitching post problem was to ask to return to
work.")).
231 Id. (citing Hope, 240 F.3d at 980) ("Hope was placed in a car and driven back to
Limestone to be cuffed to the hitching post ... it is improbable that had Hope said, 'I want to
go back to work,' a prison guard would have left his post ... to drive Hope back to the work
site.").
232 Id. at 745 ("[T]he DOJ report noted that ADOC's officers consistently failed to
comply with the policy of immediately releasing any inmate from the hitching post who
agrees to return to work.").
233 See supra notes 112-20 and accompanying text. The court, in Austin v. Hopper, 15 F.
2003]
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
the act of placing Hope in leg irons and handcuffs after the fight indicated
he had been subdued.234 Thus, when he was placed on the bar, no threat to
security existed and any questionable treatment from that point on would be
a condition of confinement demanding the deliberate indifference
standard. 235 By contrast, Austin v. Hopper, which ruled that use of the
hitching post as a disciplinary measure was unconstitutional, considered the
possibility that Hope's incident was one of emergency up through the time
that he was placed on the restraining bar.236 The district court in Austin
applied the malice standard because it believed Hope may have continued
to be a threat to security for being disruptive to the work squad. 7 Even
with this heightened standard, the Austin court held the guards had
maliciously caused the plaintiff harm because they mistreated and
humiliated him while he was on the bar, not because they improperly chose
to place him on it from the start.238 Therefore, even if the majority in Hope
had applied the heightened standard of malice and had treated the entire
incident as one of emergency, which could have been a possible
interpretation, it would not have necessarily precluded the Court's
determination that Hope's rights were violated. Thus, it appeared that the
Hope court wanted to find the guards' acts unconstitutional under a test
with a lower threshold.
Most likely, the Court intended to compel prison officials to choose
more cautiously when deciding whether their actions against inmates were
strictly punitive or necessary for good cause. Not only would this restrain
the Whitley and Hudson rulings that highlighted court deference to
administrative discretion, but also would temper lower federal court rulings
that promoted the same principles. 239 Eleventh Circuit cases like Williams
Supp. 2d 1210, 1261-65 (M.D. Ala. 1998), explained why it analyzed the guards' cuffing of
Hope to the hitching post under both the deliberate indifference standard and the malice
standard.
234 Hope, 536 U.S. at 738 ("Any safety concerns had long since abated ... because Hope
had already been subdued, handcuffed, placed in leg irons, and transported back to the
prison.").
235 Id.
236 See Austin, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 1263-65 (applying the malice standard as it was applied
to situations threatening prison order and safety in Whitley).
237 Id. at 1264-65. The Austin court noted that the one instance in the record that
indicated an emergency situation justifying the use of force was Hope's fight with six other
corrections officers which preceded his being handcuffed to the hitching post. Id.
238 Id. at 1265. The court found that the guards' act of giving water to the dogs while
allowing Hope to suffer from thirst and the lack of evidence that they had any intention of
allowing Hope to return to work indicated malicious and sadistic intent. Id.
239 See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. I, 6 (1992) (arguing that prison administrators
should be given deference in executing practices that in their judgment are necessary to
[Vol. 93
HOPE v. PELZER
v. Burton granted tremendous deference to prison authorities in their
240practical responses to perceived threats against internal security. In
Williams, after an inmate exhibited severely threatening behavior, he was
placed in a four-point restraint for twenty-eight hours even though the
dissent argued twenty-eight hours likely extended beyond the point at
which the inmate was dangerous. 241 On one hand, Williams asserted that
any continued use of harmful force after an inmate halted resistance to
authority violated the Eighth Amendment.242 On the other hand, it ruled
that the point at which restraint is no longer necessary comes under the
good judgment of prison officials.243 Under Williams's logic, an official or
administration could greatly expand his or its interpretation on which
situations are "emergencies" or justify force. Now, after Hope's ruling,
prison officials have more incentive to accurately assess genuine emergency
situations if any force against one of the inmates will result in harm.
Hope's more controlled definition of an emergency situation tempers
both Whitley and Hudson's extension of court deference to the "good
judgment" of prison administrators as well as other lower court decisions
like Williams.244  In the past, Justice Stevens' interest in removing all
subjective components from Eighth Amendment analyses reflected his
interest in the Court's duty and capacity to police constitutional violators
within the state prison system.245 Hope did not remove those components.
Instead, by flexibly interpreting the facts in order to apply a lower
subjective threshold, Hope inevitably grants the court more control over
prisons and gives less deference to the discretion of state prison
administrations.
maintain prison security); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 322 (1986) (stating that neither
judge nor jury should substitute their judgment as to whether force was necessary when
confronted with a prison threat for that of an official who made a "considered" choice).
240 Williams v. Burton, 943 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1991).
241 Id. at 1574, 1577-78.
242 Id. at 1576 ("The basic legal principle is that once the necessity for the application of
force ceases . . . any abuse directed at the prisoner after he terminates his resistance to
authority is an Eighth Amendment violation.").
243 Id. ("How long restraint may be continued calls for the exercise of good judgment on
the part of prison officials.").
244 See infra note 247 and accompanying text.
245 The subjective component to the Eighth Amendment analysis thwarted inmates'
attempts to find poor prison conditions or mistreatment unconstitutional. See JOHN A.




2. The Guards Had No Fair Notice that Their Use of the Hitching Post
Clearly Violated the Eighth Amendment Based on Eleventh Circuit
Precedent and the DOJ Report to the ADOC
The Majority argued that the guards had fair notice based on clearly
established rights through three means: (1) Eleventh Circuit precedent; (2)
ADOC Regulation; and (3) the DOJ report informing the ADOC that its use
of the hitching post was unconstitutional.246
a. Eleventh Circuit Precedent Did Not Provide Fair Notice
Justice Stevens' assertion that Supreme Court precedent provided fair
warning to the defendants of their unconstitutional conduct is well
supported. 247 According to any of the Court's earlier rulings, the guards
would have had no defense. Even under Whitley's emergency threshold,
Hope's denial of water and toilet breaks and lack of evidence that he could
return to work to end the "emergency" situation indicated unconstitutional
conduct by the guards.
However, Stevens' inclusion of Eleventh Circuit precedent as
providing fair notice for the officers is less convincing. The Court first
points to Gates, a Fifth Circuit case within Eleventh Circuit precedent,
which ruled that it was unconstitutional to cuff inmates to cells and fences
for long periods of time.248 The Court refers secondly to Ort, which held
that an official may use drastic means, including denying an inmate
drinking water or another basic human need, in order to prevent threats to
safety and order. 249 Ort, however, was careful to warn that harm inflicted
against an inmate for a past action as retaliation or using more force than
was reasonably necessary would violate the Eighth Amendment.25 °
However, it is the Circuit's more recent decision in Williams that mars the
clarity of the law, or at least the parameters to which officials should adhere
when faced with threats to prison order. In Williams, the court granted
great deference to the prison administration in its severe use of a four-point
restraint on an inmate for twenty eight hours.25 1 Williams stated that, in
246 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
247 Under the deliberate indifference standard set out by Estelle or Farmer, the guards'
acts violated the Eighth Amendment. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 827 (1994);
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Under Whitley or Hudson's malice standard,
their actions were also unconstitutional. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4-10 (1992);
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 475, 320-21 (1986).
248 Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1306 (5th Cir. 1974).
249 Ort v. White, 813 F.2d 318, 325 (1 th Cir. 1987).
250 id. at 325-26.
251 Williams v. Burton, 943 F.2d 1572 (11 th Cir. 1991).
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emergency situations, the court would rely on the officers' "good
judgment" as to when that threat had ended.252 Therefore, in applying this
legal precedent, the officers in Hope could have extended their
interpretation on the length of time Hope was a threat under Williams'
"good judgment" language. This flexibility would allow the guards to
inflict allegedly "necessary" harm on Hope even if outside observers
considered it unnecessary. For example, the dissenting judge in Williams
argued that the twenty-eight hour restraint seemed to go beyond the logical
length of time necessary to subdue an inmate who exhibited calmness at
earlier points before his release.253 However, because the majority in
Williams granted deference to the good judgment of the officers as to the
necessary length of restraint, outside judgment of what seemed reasonable
proved irrelevant. 4 Therefore, Eleventh Circuit precedent did not seem to
provide fair notice for the guards in Hope. A reasonable officer in Hope
could have believed he was not violating the inmate's rights if he had the
discretion to restrain an inmate under the Williams logic. He could merely
defend any prisoner's length of time on a hitching post as appropriate to
maintain security in his "good judgment."
Fortunately, no matter which Circuit decision may have extended the
discretionary authority of prison administrators, the superiority of Supreme
Court precedent already provided fair notice to the guards that their acts
were repugnant to Eighth Amendment principles. In sum, the defendants in
Hope ultimately had no defense; they had adequate case law to deduce that
their actions violated the Constitution.
b. DOJ Report to the ADOC Did Not Provide Fair Notice
There is also no support or explanation for the Majority's conclusion
that a 1994 DOJ report which investigated the common misuse of the
hitching post and declared the practice unconstitutional would have
provided "fair notice" to the guards. Justice Thomas levied this criticism in
his dissent, but it went unanswered by Stevens. In Hope, the court noted
that there was no evidence the ADOC communicated the report to
anyone. 255 Moreover, there was no indication that the department altered its
internal policy as a response to the DOJ report so that officers could have
known about the DOJ's statement. 256 "Fair notice" is defined as "clearly
252 Id. at 1576.
253 Id. at 1577 (Pittman, J., dissenting).
254 Id. (Pittman, J., dissenting).
255 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 745 (2002) ("[T]here is nothing in the record indicating
the DOJ's views were communicated to respondents.").
256 Austin v. Hopper, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1249 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (showing that the
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established law" that would sufficiently inform an officer that his conduct
was unconstitutional regardless of whether or not that exact conduct was
previously found unlawful. 7 Therefore, a DOJ report would not provide
officers with "fair notice" because an investigational report is unequal to
prior case law that an officer is under a duty to know. As the Supreme
Court stated when explaining the requirements of claiming qualified
immunity under §1983 in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, a "reasonably competent
public official should know the law governing his conduct., 258 Thus, the
Court was justified in ruling that the officers in Hope should have been
aware of their constitutional violations based on earlier Supreme Court
decisions regarding use of force, but there is no basis to claim non-legal
forms of notice were necessarily "fair."
The Majority's inclusion of the DOJ memorandum within its rubric of
fair notice appeared to set a precedent for state prison administrations that
federal warnings on unconstitutional policies would still establish
individual liability for its officers, regardless of whether the administration
chose to modify its actual prison practices. This arrangement would both
compel state administrations to inform their officers of the federal branches'
constitutional interpretations of the prison's policies and encourage state
officers to comply with any official warning from such branches castigating
state-sanctioned policies or practices as unconstitutional. Under Hope,
compliance would be the only way for those officers to completely avert
individual liability under § 1983 for conduct found unconstitutional either
by precedent law or by the federal government-in this case the Executive
Branch. In this way, the Court clearly forced the state's executive and
legislative branches to heed the federal government's constitutional
criticisms of their state management. The issue then is whether or not this
violated the "separation of powers" principle.
3. The Federalism Question. Did the Court in Hope Overstep Its Judicial
Bounds?
The Supreme Court Justices have continually disagreed on the level of
judicial intervention allowed in state prison management. Rhodes v.
DOC had disagreed with the DOJ's finding that its use of the hitching post was
unconstitutional and argued it was a "valid means of maintaining security"); id at 1262
("There is no evidence in the record to show that after its receipt of the Department of
Justice's letters the DOC interviewed or monitored officers . . . to determine whether
violations of [the hitching post regulation] were taking place.").
257 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
258 457 U.S. at 819.
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Chapman underscored this tension when it held that the "double-ceiling" of
prisoners was a discretionary decision of prison administration. 259  The
policy was not unconstitutional unless it violated a basic human need,
which would then legitimatize judicial protection.260 Otherwise, the Court
argued that courts should not intervene in prison management-a
jurisdiction of the state legislatures-and should never assume that the
state's executive and legislative branches are "insensitive" to constitutional
requirements.261 While the Court recognized that the courts were "ill-
equipped" to take charge of prison reform needs, it assured that it would
intervene when the Constitution had been violated.262 Therefore, on one
hand Hope's judicial directive to halt the use of the hitching post did not
invade the state's administrative or legislative pale.263 There was sufficient
evidence that the restraining bar in Alabama's prison system was used or
consistently misused in a way that deprived inmates of basic human needs,
such as water, toilet breaks or protection from exposure. 264 There was also
evidence that it was frequently used by guards to retaliate against prisoners
for past offenses instead of for "emergency situations," constituting cruel
and unusual punishment due to its lack of penological purpose.265 Unlike
Rhodes' lack of factual support that double-celling proved cruel and
unusual or deprived inmates of basic human needs, Hope had ample support
from another district court case, testimony from the ADOC Commissioner,
and the investigational findings of the DOJ that the hitching post invited
constitutional violations.266
259 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981) ("[T]hese considerations ... are weighed by the legislature
and prison administration rather than a court.").
260 Id. at 348.
261 Id. at 352.
262 Id. at 351-52 (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974)).
263 Because the Constitution does not spell out specifically the proper relationship
between the three branches of government or the relationship between federal and state
authority, there is no "compelling" argument against judicial intervention if constitutional
rights are in fact being violated. Powers and responsibilities of the branches overlap.
FLITER, supra note 245, at 12. "In prison reform, the actions and omissions of legislative
bodies and executive agencies have created the impetus for judicial intervention ... appeals
to federalism and states' rights are not a sufficient argument against federal judicial
intervention." Id.
264 Austin v. Hopper, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1247 (M.D. Ala. 1998) ("Inmates were not
given water while shackled to the hitching post, and were denied access to toilet facilities
while shackled ... certain corrections officers ... taunted [inmates] while they were clearly
suffering from dehydration or had been forced to defecate or urinate in their clothes.").
265 Id. at 1249-50.
266 In Rhodes, the Court found that there was no factual evidence that double-ceiling
inflicted either unnecessary or wanton pain or was a punishment grossly disproportionate to
the severity of the inmates' crimes, for example, double-ceiling did not deprive prisoners of
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On the other hand, Hope's inclusion of the DOJ report as sufficient
"fair notice" to officers that their conduct was unconstitutional pushes the
limits of judicial authority in prison management in terms of its effects. It
was unnecessary for Hope to rule this way in order to find individual
liability with the officers as they had fair notice of their violations through
prior Supreme Court decisions. The only purpose of this ruling would then
be to compel state administrations to acknowledge the federal government's
constitutional criticisms of their policies and practices and to inform their
officers who would fear individual liability for conduct that disregarded
federal warnings. Therefore, even before the judiciary could rule at law
whether certain conduct was in fact unconstitutional, an officer would have
to comply with federal criticism against certain state-sanctioned policies in
anticipation that such criticism may be found legitimate by the courts later,
subjecting him to individual liability under § 1983.
While the Hope Court may have exceeded its judicial limits in this one
respect, it cannot be overlooked that Alabama's state prison system has
been the battleground between the federal judiciary and the state's
executive and legislative branches before. This is not the first time the
federal courts have vigorously criticized the Alabama state prison system
for egregious constitutional violations for its inhumane treatment of its
prisoners and for frustrating judicial orders to correct those violations.267
Most notably, in district court cases such as Pugh v. Locke268 and Newman
v. Alabama,269 the judiciary imposed specific parameters for the state
system to instill regarding overcrowding, segregation and isolation, mental
health care, protection from violence, living conditions and food service
among others.270 In the end, Alabama's legislature was able to avoid total
basic human needs. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348. In contrast, the Hope court had the benefit of
factual support from the evidentiary records in Austin and the DOJ reports. Hope v. Pelzer,
536 U.S. 730 (2002). Also, in Austin, the ADOC Commissioner testified that some of the
state-sanctioned premises for cuffing an inmate to the post that were non-emergency
situations were improper. 15 F. Supp. 2d at 1240.
267 Newman v. Alabama, 466 F. Supp. 628, 635-36 (M.D. Ala. 1979) ("The history of
federal litigation in Alabama is replete with instances of state officials who could have
chosen one of any number of courses to alleviate unconstitutional conditions of which they
were fully aware, and who chose instead to do nothing."). See also Consuelo A. Vasquez,
Prometheus Rebound by the Devolving Standards of Decency: The Resurrection of the Chain
Gang, I 1 ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 221, 224 nn.68-72 (1995).
268 406 F. Supp. 318, 331-37 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
269 349 F. Supp. 278 286-88 (M.D. Ala. 1972). Newman ordered the state to comply
with medical care guidelines for prisoners designed by the court. Id. Five years later, in
Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 289 (5th Cir. 1977), the court held that the Human
Rights Committee appointed earlier intruded on the ADOC's discretion to execute and
implement prison policies and practices.
270 Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 328-36 (1976). The Pugh court appointed a Human
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compliance by excusing their failures through claims of limited funding. 271
Although these court orders definitely intruded upon state administration, it
appeared that the state's executive and legislative branches had little
incentive to ensure constitutional conditions for prisoners otherwise. As
Justice Brennan would later recount in Rhodes, "public apathy and the
political powerlessness of inmates have contributed to the pervasive neglect
of the prisons. 272  In truth, when Alabama's executive and legislative
branches failed in their duty to protect the inmates, it seemed there was little
choice but to protect prisoner rights through judicial intervention.273  In
Hope's case, the state administration's total disregard of a 1994 warning
from the Executive Branch, regarding a specific prison practice, could have
rekindled the judiciary's suspicions of Alabama's chronic failure to uphold
constitutional practices for its prisons. Thus, taking all the facts in totality,
perhaps the judiciary did not overstep its bounds if this was the only way to
institute a check on the delinquent administration of prisons by the other
branches.274
VI. CONCLUSION
In sum, Hope v. Pelzer held that: (1) Hope was subjected to cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment when prison
guards cuffed him to a hitching post for disruptive behavior after he was
already subdued, (2) officials can still be on notice that their conduct
violates established law even in novel factual circumstances, and (3) the
Alabama prison guards in this case were not entitled to qualified immunity
from inmate's claim in light of (a) binding Eleventh Circuit precedent, (b)
Rights Committee to implement "Minimum Constitutional Standards for Inmates of the
Alabama Penal System" and ensure compliance by the state administration to prevent
unconstitutional prison conditions or inmate mistreatment. This case exhibited the federal
court's active intervention in an area typically reserved for the state legislative and executive
powers with its detailed provisions on how the state was to preserve constitutional prison
conditions.
271 Newman, 466 F. Supp. at 629-30 (arguing that the failure of Alabama's Board of
Corrections to remedy the "conditions of confinement" so as not to violate the Eighth
Amendment in compliance with federal court order could not legally be excused by the state
legislature's failure to adequately fund these court-ordered improvements).
272 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 358 (1981).
273 Newman, 466 F. Supp. at 635-36
There can be no doubt that the paramount duty of the federal judiciary is to uphold the law ...
when a state fails to comply with the Constitution, the federal courts are compelled to enforce it.
The habit that some states have fallen into of ignoring their responsibilities until they are faced
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the ADOC regulation on hitching posts, and (c) the DOJ report informing
the ADOC that its hitching post regulation was constitutionally infirm.27 5
The Court's decision to apply the deliberate indifference standard in
this case signifies its attempt to narrow the application of the malice
standard by scrutinizing more critically the point at which an emergency
situation terminates and an inquiry into a lower threshold of deliberate
indifference begins. Ultimately, this increased scrutiny results in a higher
capacity for judicial intervention and less discretionary authority from state
prison staff. Instead, the court-and not merely the officers' good
judgment-determines when a threat to security has ended and when the
use of force or an infliction of pain becomes punitive, excessive and cruel.
Hope also expanded the sources of "fair notice" in its inclusion of the DOJ
warning to the ADOC of the prison's unconstitutional punishments so that
officers would be more accountable, and even financially responsible, for
violating constitutional rights.
In sum, Hope is a decision that moves the Court in the direction of
increased judicial intervention in state prison policies and practices.
However, such intervention may be warranted when a state such as
Alabama has continuously allowed its executive and legislative branches to
neglect the constitutional rights of it inmates. 276  As Justice Brennan
reminds the Rhodes Court of the critical role the judiciary has played in
reforming inhumane prison conditions, "judicial intervention is
indispensable if constitutional dictates . . . are to be observed in the
prisons. 277
Alison Chin
275 Hope, 536 U.S. 730.
276 FL|TER, supra note 245, at 14 ("Prisoners, probably more so than any other minority
group in society, need to have their rights protected by the courts, because it is not in the
political interests of members of Congress or state legislatures to champion the rights of
convicted person.").
277 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 354 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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